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DUELING DENOMINATORS AND THE DEMISE
OF LUCAS
Stewart E. Sterk*

In Murr v. Wisconsin, the Supreme Court outlined a process for ascertaining the
denominator in takings cases—an issue that arises both with respect to Penn
Central takings claims and Lucas takings claims. The underpinnings of Penn
Central claims and Lucas claims are not identical: Penn Central’s primary
concern is assuring fairness to landowners, while the focus of Lucas is on
restricting government efforts to bypass the condemnation process. Although this
difference in focus might suggest a difference in appropriate denominator, the
Court’s multi-factor balancing approach apparently applies to all takings claims.
Although the Court’s approach is consistent with Penn Central objectives, it is less
consistent with Lucas objectives, and reduces the likelihood that Lucas claims will
be successful.
At the same time, the Court’s opinion, if taken literally, appears to break both with
basic federalism principles and with the Court’s own doctrine by rejecting state
law as the source for the takings denominator. Closer analysis reveals, however,
that the factors outlined by the Court remain closely tied to state law, resulting in
less of a break with principle and precedent than suggested by Chief Justice
Roberts’s dissent.
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INTRODUCTION
The so-called denominator problem has long played a central role in
scholarship1 and doctrine2 focused on the U.S. Constitution’s Takings Clause. The
problem arises in two related but different contexts.
First, to the extent the Takings Clause protects a landowner’s investmentbacked expectations, judicial inquiry must ascertain the baseline property against
which to measure those expectations.3 For instance, if the City of New York
precludes all but nominal construction atop Grand Central Terminal, is the relevant
baseline “air rights above the terminal,” where the City has confiscated nearly
100% of the relevant rights; or is it the surface and air rights together, where the
loss to the landowner is a much smaller percentage of total value?4
Second, ascertaining the relevant denominator is absolutely critical in
applying the Supreme Court’s per se rule prohibiting government regulation that
denies a landowner “all economically beneficial or productive use of its land.”5
For instance, if a state prohibits all development on several acres of waterfront
land it has declared wetlands, can the landowner claim a per se taking if the

1.
Frank Michelman coined the phrase in his landmark 1967 article, Frank
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just
Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1192 (1967). Margaret Radin has applied the
label conceptual severance to the attempt to define the denominator narrowly. Margaret
Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of
Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1674–78 (1988).
2.
See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001); Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978).
3.
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130 n.27.
4.
See id. at 130–31 (holding that the entire city block serves as the
denominator).
5.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015–16 (1992).
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landowner also owns adjacent land on which state and local law still permit
development?6
Although the Supreme Court has recognized the denominator problem on
several occasions, not until Murr v. Wisconsin,7 decided last term, has the Court
outlined a process for ascertaining the relevant denominator. In Murr, the Court
sustained a Wisconsin regulation providing that a substandard parcel loses its
grandfathered status when it comes into common ownership with an adjacent
parcel.8 The result itself was uncontroversial; Chief Justice Roberts, dissenting for
himself and Justices Thomas and Alito, started by conceding that the Court’s
“bottom-line conclusion does not trouble me.”9 Disagreement arose, however,
about the appropriate method for determining the denominator.
Following Part I’s exploration of the Murr case itself, Part II of this
Article explores competing approaches to the denominator problem. After
explaining that the appropriate solution to the denominator problem may depend
on which takings question a court is trying to answer, Part II examines the
theoretical shortcomings of both the majority opinion and the dissent, focusing
particularly on inadequate attention to the interplay between state and federal law.
Part III turns to the practical import of Murr and argues that Murr may signal the
beginning of the end for the per se rule invalidating regulations that deny
landowners all economically productive use of their land.

I. BACKGROUND
A. The Takings Framework
For the last 25 years, implicit takings doctrine has been marked by a
combination of an ad hoc balancing test and two per se rules.10 The Supreme Court
first articulated the balancing test in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of
New York,11 a case sustaining landmark regulation of New York’s Grand Central
Terminal. After Penn Central had leased the air rights above the terminal to a
developer, the City’s Landmarks Preservation Commission—acting pursuant to its
regulatory mandate—rejected two separate plans to build an office tower atop the
terminal.12 While rejecting the argument that the City had taken property by
precluding use of the airspace, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan,
concluded that takings cases should turn on “essentially ad hoc, factual
inquiries.”13 Among the factors to be balanced is “the extent to which the

6.
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631 (declining to resolve the issue because the issue
was not presented in state courts or on petition for certiorari).
7.
137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
8.
Id. at 1940–41 (describing Wisconsin regulations).
9.
Id. at 1950.
10.
See generally James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of
Implicit Takings, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 35, 42-45 (2016).
11.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
12.
Id. at 116–19.
13.
Id. at 124.
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regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.”14
Determining how much interference there has been requires some sense of the
appropriate denominator: measured against Penn Central’s real-estate holdings in
midtown Manhattan, the interference was relatively small;15 measured against the
air rights above the terminal, the interference was arguably close to 100%.16
After Penn Central, the Court removed two classes of cases from the ad
hoc balancing test. First, the Court in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp.,17 held that a permanent, physical occupation always constitutes a taking and
requires compensation. Because few regulations involve physical occupations,
Loretto has limited significance in the regulatory context.18 Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council,19 decided a decade later, threatened to make a more
significant impact on land-use regulation. In Lucas, the Court held that a South
Carolina regulation that barred habitable structures on a landowner’s beachfront
land constituted a taking.20 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia concluded that
whenever a regulation denies a landowner all economically beneficial or
productive use of land, the landowner is entitled to compensation.21 As with Penn
Central, the denominator is critical to the Lucas approach: whether the owner has
been deprived of all economically beneficial use will often depend on what
constitutes the applicable unit of land.
In both Penn Central and Lucas, the Court recognized the importance of
the denominator problem. In Penn Central, the Court rejected the argument that
the air rights over the terminal should constitute the relevant denominator,
indicating that takings “jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
14.
Id.
15.
The New York Court of Appeals, in the opinion below, concluded that some
of the income from Penn Central’s real estate holdings in the Grand Central area should be
imputed to the terminal. Id. at 121. The Supreme Court later concluded that this approach
was “unsupportable.” Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 n.7
(1992).
16.
Justice Rehnquist, in his Penn Central dissent, argued that the city officials
“have thus destroyed—in a literal sense, ‘taken’—substantial property rights of Penn
Central.” 438 U.S. at 143 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
17.
458 U.S. 419 (1982).
18.
Occasionally, however, courts have concluded that a regulation operates as
the equivalent of a permanent, physical occupation. For instance, in Seawall Assocs. v. City
of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1065 (N.Y. 1989), the New York Court of Appeals
concluded that a New York City local law requiring owners of single-room occupancy
properties to refurbish existing structures and keep them fully rented constituted a
permanent physical occupation, and therefore violated the Takings Clause per se.
19.
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
20.
The Court remanded for resolution of a narrow question of state law: did
background principles of state property law preclude the landowner from developing the
land even before the challenged regulation was enacted? Id. at 1031–32. But the Court
expressed its view that “[i]t seems unlikely that common-law principles would have
prevented the erection of any habitable or productive improvements on petitioner’s
land . . . .” Id. at 1031.
21.
Id. at 1015–16.
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segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have
been entirely abrogated.”22 Instead, the focus is on the “parcel as a whole,” which,
in the context of Penn Central, the Court concluded was “the city tax block
designated as the ‘landmark site.’”23 In Lucas, Justice Scalia characterized the
denominator issue as a difficult question and noted that the difficulty was
avoidable in Lucas itself because the trial court had found that the statute left each
of Lucas’s lots without economic value.24
Penn Central and Lucas have remained the twin pillars of the Supreme
Court’s takings jurisprudence. In subsequent cases, the Court has acknowledged
the denominator problem without endorsing any particular solution.25
B. The Murr Case
1. The Facts
In 1960, the Murr parents bought a parcel, known as Lot F, along the St.
Croix River and built a recreational cabin on the parcel which has 100 feet of river
frontage.26 The following year, they transferred title to the family plumbing
company.27 Two years later, in 1963, they purchased an adjacent parcel, Lot E,
which has 60 feet of river frontage.28 A bluff runs through both parcels with level
land above each bluff and level land along the river.29 Lot E was, and remains,
vacant.30
After Congress designated the river for federal protection and required
Wisconsin and Minnesota to designate a management plan for the area, the
Wisconsin legislature in 1973 authorized the State Department of Natural
Resources to develop regulations limiting development.31 The Department enacted
a regulation precluding use of lots as separate building sites unless they have at
least one acre of land suitable for development.32 Although Lots E and F each
comprise more than one acre, the steep terrain limits the combined buildable area

22.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978).
23.
Id.
24.
505 U.S. at 1016 n.7. Without resolving the issue, Justice Scalia suggested
that the “answer to this difficult question may lie in how the owner’s reasonable
expectations have been shaped by the State’s law of property.” Id.
25.
See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001) (noting use of
“parcel as a whole” rule and “discomfort with the logic of this rule”).
26.
Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1940 (2017).
27.
Id.
28.
Id.
29.
Id.
30.
Id. at 1941 (discussing status of Lot E as an undevelopable lot).
31.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 30.27(2) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Act 135).
32.
WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 118.06(1)(a)(2)(a) (2017) required a minimum lot
size of “at least one acre of net project area.” WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 118.03(27) defined
net project area to mean “developable land area minus slope preservation zones,
floodplains, road rights-of-way and wetlands.”
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of the lots to just under one acre.33 Neither lot, on its own, approaches the one-acre
minimum.34
The Wisconsin regulations, however, exempted substandard lots “in
separate ownership from abutting lands” on January 1, 1976.35 Thus, Lot E
remained a permissible building lot. The regulations, however, also included a
merger provision, providing that adjacent lots under common ownership may not
be “sold or developed as separate lots” if they don’t meet the minimum lot-size
requirement.36 The regulations, like many land-use ordinances, authorize the grant
of variances where enforcement would cause unnecessary hardship.37
Nearly two decades later, in 1994, the parents’ plumbing company
transferred title to Lot F to the four Murr children.38 The following year, the
children acquired title to Lot E.39
A decade later, when the children sought to sell Lot E to fund changes to
the cabin on Lot F, they faced a difficulty: their acquisition of the two lots had
brought them under common ownership and had triggered the merger provision in
the regulations. They sought a variance, which the county Board of Adjustment
denied.40 When the Wisconsin courts upheld the variance denial, the Murr children
brought a state court action challenging the regulations as a taking. They alleged
that the regulations had deprived them of “all, or practically all, of the use of Lot E
because the lot cannot be sold or developed as a separate lot.”41
2. The Fundamental Question: What Action Constituted the Alleged Taking?
Before turning to the denominator problem, consider what actions might
have constituted a taking of the Murrs’ property. The first candidate is the State’s
imposition of a requirement that each building site have one acre of land suitable
for development. That action did not constitute a complete prohibition on
development of Lot E. The Murrs could certainly have built a larger cabin that
straddled the border between Lots E and F, or could have demolished the cabin on
Lot F in favor of a more modern cabin on Lot E. But even if the one-acre
requirement would otherwise have constituted a complete prohibition on
development of Lot E, the statute expressly grandfathered lots created before
January 1, 1976.42 So, in fact, the one-acre requirement allowed the thenlandowners—the Murr parents—to use the land for all purposes that would have
been permissible before the restriction was imposed. Even using Lot E as the
33.
34.
35.
36.

Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1940.
Id. at 1940–41.
WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 118.08(4).
WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 118.08(4)(a)(2). On variances generally, see
STEWART E. STERK, EDUARDO M. PENALVER, & SARA C. BRONIN, LAND USE REGULATION
28–39 (2d ed. 2016).
37.
WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 118.09(4)(b).
38.
Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1941.
39.
Id.
40.
Id.
41.
Id.
42.
WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 118.08(4).
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denominator, that restriction could not have constituted a taking under either Lucas
or Penn Central.
Next, consider the statute’s merger provision, which would cause
forfeiture of Lot E’s grandfathered status if Lot E were to come under common
ownership with an adjacent lot.43 The merger provision permitted the owners of
Lot E—the Murr parents—to exercise every attribute of ownership they enjoyed
before the regulations were imposed, save for one: they could not sell Lot E to a
person or entity who owned abutting land without losing the right to build. But the
Murrs could have built on Lot E, or they could have sold Lot E to a prospective
purchaser who wanted to develop the lot. In light of the alternatives available to
the Murrs, they had no plausible claim that the merger provision effected a Lucas
taking and no serious claim that the merger provision violated the Penn Central
balancing test by significantly interfering with investment-backed expectations.
Finally, consider the Board of Adjustment’s variance denial. Variances
have long been conceptualized as constitutional safety valves, enabling a local
body to rescue a landowner who would otherwise be subject to an unconstitutional
taking.44 But the two preceding paragraphs establish that in Murr, Wisconsin’s
actions could not have constituted an unconstitutional taking, even if Lot E were
treated as the relevant denominator. If that is true, then the Board of Adjustment
could not have been acting unconstitutionally in denying the variance application.
The basic point, then, is that the denominator problem should have been
irrelevant on the facts of the Murr case. Regardless of denominator, the Murrs’
takings claim had no merit. Moreover, the merger doctrine embodied in the
Wisconsin statute is a longstanding and well-established zoning tool,45 and if the
Court had sustained the takings claim, it would have jeopardized the merger
doctrine nationwide. But the Court granted certiorari, and both Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion and Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent focused on the denominator
issue. The next section explores their respective treatments of the issue.
3. The Court’s Approach to the Denominator Problem
In his treatment of the denominator problem, Justice Kennedy started by
reviewing the Court’s precedents, which made clear that the denominator should
not be limited to the property interests targeted by the regulation, but should
instead include “the parcel as a whole.”46 He relied first on Penn Central, in which
the Court declined to segment property vertically, refused to focus on air rights
alone, and instead concluded that the parcel as a whole included the entire city
block on which Grand Central Terminal was located.47 He then cited Tahoe-Sierra
43.
44.

WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 118.08(4)(a)(2).
See, e.g., JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER, THOMAS E. ROBERTS, PATRICIA
E. SALKIN & RYAN ROWBERRY, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW
§ 5.14 (3d ed. 2013).
45.
See, e.g., ARDEN H. RATHKOPF & DAREN A. RATHKOPF, RATHKOPF’S THE
LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 49.13 (4th ed. 2011).
46.
Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1944.
47.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978).
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Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,48 in which the
Court rejected an attempt to segment property temporally.49 In Tahoe-Sierra, the
Court rejected a landowner’s challenge to a temporary moratorium that had lasted
32 months, concluding that disaggregation of the property into temporal segments
was an improper approach to the denominator problem.50
Justice Kennedy then purported to derive another principle from prior
cases: property rights under the Takings Clause should not be coextensive with
state-law property rights.51 As an example, he indicated that a state could not
insulate itself from a takings claim by enacting a law consolidating all nonadjacent
property owned by a single person anywhere in the state and then imposing
development limits on the aggregate set.52
After his survey of the Court’s precedents, Justice Kennedy turned to the
heart of his opinion: courts must consider multiple factors in determining the
denominator for taking purposes. Without indicating that the factors were
exhaustive, he identified three factors courts should consider to “determine
whether reasonable expectations about property ownership would lead a
landowner to anticipate that his holdings would be treated as one parcel, or,
instead, as separate tracts.”53 The three factors he named are the following: (1)
treatment of the land under state and local law; (2) the physical characteristics of
the land; and (3) the prospective value of the regulated land.54 Treatment under
state and local law is perhaps the easiest of the three to understand, but Justice
Kennedy elaborated on the other two factors. Physical characteristics of the land
might be relevant if topography or other factors make it likely that the land would
become subject to regulation.55 In discussing the prospective value of the regulated
land, Justice Kennedy noted that in some cases, regulation of one parcel of land
might increase the value of remaining land “by increasing privacy, expanding
recreational space, or preserving surrounding natural beauty.”56 In those instances,
he suggested, it might be appropriate to treat the land together as a single parcel.57
Applying the multi-factor approach to the Murr case, the Court concluded
that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals had been correct in treating the merged
parcel—Lots E and F together—as the denominator for takings purposes.58 First,
under state law, the lots were merged for a legitimate purpose and as a result of the

48.
535 U.S. 302 (2002).
49.
Id. at 332 (“[A] permanent deprivation of the owner’s use of the entire area is
a taking of “the parcel as a whole,” whereas a temporary restriction that merely causes a
diminution in value is not.”).
50.
Id. at 331.
51.
137 S. Ct. at 1944–45.
52.
Id. at 1945.
53.
Id.
54.
Id. at 1945–46.
55.
Id.
56.
Id. at 1946.
57.
Id.
58.
Id. at 1948.
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Murrs’ voluntary conduct.59 Second, the physical characteristics of the land along a
regulated river should have led the Murrs to anticipate public regulation.60 Third,
treating the lots as a whole allows increased privacy and recreational activity on
the combined parcel.61 Once the Court established the combined lot as the
appropriate denominator, the Court had no difficulty in rejecting the Murrs’
takings claim.
Chief Justice Roberts, dissenting, rejected the majority’s multi-factor
approach to the denominator problem, arguing instead that state-law boundary
definitions “should, in all but the most exceptional circumstances, determine the
parcel at issue.”62 He argued that the Court had never before relied on anything
other than state property law principles in identifying the relevant private property
against which government regulation is measured.63 In his view, the Murr case
should have been remanded to the Wisconsin courts for identification of the
relevant property “using ordinary principles of Wisconsin property law.”64 He
contended that the Wisconsin courts had erred by applying a “takings specific
definition of the property at issue” rather than asking whether “under general state
law principles, Lots E and F are legally distinct parcels of land.”65

II. THE ELUSIVE DENOMINATOR
A. Two Problems or One?
Much of the confusion over the denominator problem arises because the
Court uses the same term to solve two separate, albeit related, problems. The
denominator is relevant in evaluating Penn Central takings claims because the
objective with respect to those claims is to determine whether an otherwise-valid
regulation has deprived landowners of a reasonable return on their investment.66
Developers operate in an environment marked by a variety of risks, including
regulatory risks.67 Those risks are priced into the land they purchase.68 Some of

59.
Id.
60.
Id.
61.
Id.
62.
Id. at 1953 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
63.
Id. at 1954.
64.
Id. at 1956.
65.
Id.
66.
In Penn Central itself, the landowner conceded for purposes of its takings
challenge that the Terminal was capable of earning a reasonable return. 438 U.S. 104, 129
(1978). The Court considered it important that the city’s landmarks regulation enabled
landowner to obtain a reasonable return on its investment. Id. at 136. Reasonable return
need not be measured against the landowner’s initial investment because, as courts have
noted, such a standard would reward landowners who paid more for their investment over
those who paid less. See, e.g., Park Ave. Tower Assocs. v. City of New York, 746 F.2d 135,
140 (2d Cir. 1984).
67.
See Christopher Serkin, Local Property Law: Adjusting the Scale of Property
Protection, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 883, 901–02 (2007) (detailing regulatory risks facing
developers).
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those risks will eventuate and others will not. If the goal of the Penn Central
takings analysis is to determine whether a landowner’s justified expectations have
been disappointed, a broad-based denominator is most consistent with that goal.69
Focusing on a narrow slice of the developer’s investments would blind courts to
the fact that the developer may have profited significantly on her overall
development portfolio.
By contrast, Lucas takings claims have far less to do with ensuring
landowners a reasonable return. In Lucas, the Court justified its categorical rule by
noting that total deprivation of beneficial use is equivalent of physical
appropriation for which compensation is invariably due.70 In effect, the Court
expressed concern that the government would use regulation to bypass its
condemnation power. Defining the denominator broadly would frustrate efforts to
prevent condemnation bypass; so long as the landowner owned enough land, the
government could preclude all development on some of it without falling afoul of
the Lucas prohibition.
Consider, for instance, a landowner who acquires 20 acres of land with
plans to develop the land residentially. The state then creates a preserve designed
to protect the habitat of the Karner Blue butterfly, a rare species in the area.71 Two
of the landowner’s 20 acres fall within the preserve where the state has prohibited
all development. Residential development remains permissible on the other 18
acres. Using the 20 acres as a denominator is fully consistent with the Penn
Central objective of protecting landowners’ justified expectations by ensuring
landowners a reasonable return. But using 20 acres as a denominator enables the
state to bypass condemnation of the 2 acres, which is inconsistent with the
concerns expressed in Lucas.
Which of these objectives—protecting justified expectations or avoiding
condemnation bypass—lie at the heart of takings doctrine remains an issue of
considerable controversy. Courts that focus on safeguarding justified expectations
68.
See generally Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations in
Taking Law, 27 URB. LAW. 215, 232–36 (1995) (noting elements of speculation in purchase
of land in light of regulatory risk).
69.
How to determine what expectations are reasonable or justified remains a
disputed question. To the extent courts decide what expectations are justified, there is an
element of circularity in the formulation. As Justice Kennedy put it in his Lucas
concurrence, “[t]here is an inherent tendency towards circularity in this synthesis, of course;
for if the owner’s reasonable expectations are shaped by what courts allow as a proper
exercise of governmental authority, property tends to become what courts say it is.” Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See generally Steven J. Eagle, Property Tests, Due Process Tests and Regulatory Takings
Jurisprudence, 2007 B.Y.U. L. REV 899, 915 (2007).
70.
505 U.S. at 1017. See generally David A. Dana, Why Do We Have the
Parcel-As-A-Whole Rule?, 39 VT. L. REV. 617, 634 (2015) (noting that once one concludes
that property has lost all value, the regulation appears to be the functional equivalent of
outright condemnation).
71.
Cf. Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. Common Council of Albany, 918 N.E.2d 917,
919 (N.Y. 2009) (discussing acreage set aside for preservation of Karner Blues).
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provide greater protection for homeowners and others for whom real property has
subjective value, and less for developers who invest with knowledge of regulatory
risks.72 By contrast, those who focus on condemnation bypass see no reason why
government should be able to avoid compensating large landowners more easily
than small ones.73 Differences in perspective on the constitutional objective have
substantial implications for the choice of denominator.
B. Alternative Approaches and Their Limits
Courts and scholars have proposed a variety of approaches to the
denominator problem. Each of them is generally consistent with either Penn
Central concerns or Lucas concerns, but not both.
1. All Contiguous Land in Common Ownership
One approach is to treat all contiguous land owned by the regulated
landowner as the denominator for any takings claim.74 If the takings goal is to
ensure that a legislative change in state law does not deprive the affected
landowner of the ability to realize a reasonable return on investment, a focus on all
contiguous land advances that objective.75 Suppose, for instance, a developer
proposes a 100-unit residential subdivision on a 30-acre tract, and, as a condition
of approval the municipality, requires the developer to set aside 2 of the 30 acres
for parkland to service the subdivision. If the developer had purchased the 30 acres
from a single owner, using the whole 30 acres as the denominator would enable a
court to evaluate whether the parkland restriction left the developer with a
reasonable return. But even if the developer had bought 28 acres from one seller
and the other 2 from a different owner, the developer presumably expected a return
on the total proposed development; from the developer’s perspective, land is a

72.
See, e.g., Eduardo Penalver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2182,
2213–15 (2004); see also Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV.
957, 960 (1982).
73.
See, e.g., John E. Fee, The Takings Clause as a Comparative Right, 76 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1032 (2003).
74.
See, e.g., K & K Constr., Inc., v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 575 N.W.2d 531, 538
(Mich. 1998) (aggregating contiguous parcels owned by same owner). See generally Eagle,
supra note 69, at 939.
75.
A number of courts have suggested that contiguous land previously owned
by the landowner, and later sold, should be counted as part of the denominator if the land
already sold was “sufficiently connected” to the land retained. See K & K Constr., Inc., 575
N.W.2d at 538 (remanding to determine whether already developed and sold parcel had
been held in common ownership and was sufficiently connected to parcel retained); City of
Annapolis v. Waterman, 745 A.2d 1000, 1022 n.19 (Md. 2000) (finding no taking even if
the denominator were limited to property still owned by the developer, but suggesting that
when developer has received economic benefit from sales of earlier phases, “[a]n
assessment of economic viability may well require consideration of the whole three-phase
project”).
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fungible commodity, and the fact that the purchase came from 2 sellers did not
significantly alter the character of the investment.76
Opposition to using all contiguous land as the denominator has generally
focused on the opportunity for manipulation by landowners. If a landowner who
owns 30 acres is stuck with the entire 30 acres as a denominator, why not
subdivide the land into 30 separate one-acre parcels held in separate ownership, so
that significant limitations on any of the parcels would be evaluated against a
much smaller denominator?77 In fact, however, restrictions on subdivision limit the
opportunity for that kind of manipulation. If a developer wants to subdivide a large
parcel into smaller ones, the developer typically needs approval from a
government body.78 The cost and delay associated with subdivision will make that
unattractive unless and until the developer has a development project in mind.
Nevertheless, from a Lucas perspective, using all contiguous land as the
denominator remains problematic. If the goal of the Lucas doctrine is to prevent
municipalities from using regulation as a means of bypassing condemnation, using
contiguous land as a common denominator makes it easier for a municipality to
acquire land for public use, especially from large landowners. If 30 acres were
owned by 30 separate owners, and the municipality wanted to ensure that 2 acres
remained open space, the municipality would not be entitled to preclude 2 of the
landowners from developing their sites unless the municipality used its
condemnation power.79 If, however, the 30 acres are owned by the same owner and
the entire 30 acres are used as the denominator, the municipality would find it
easier to avoid using its condemnation power.

76.
For the argument that takings doctrine generally should provide less
protection to fungible property than to non-fungible property, see Penalver, supra note 72,
at 2213–15; see also Radin, supra note 72, at 960.
77.
See, e.g., Dana, supra note 70, at 633 (noting that developers could respond
“by simply holding their parcels as collections of smaller, separately titled interests”); Fee,
supra note 73, at 1031 (noting that treating all contiguous land as the denominator
“encourages one to increase the rights inherent in a bundle of private property by
subdividing it among owners”).
78.
See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 236.10 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Act 135)
(detailing approvals necessary for a subdivision). The Wisconsin statute applies to division
of a lot into five or more parcels. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 236.02(12) (West, Westlaw through
2017 Act 135). Other states have a more expansive definition of subdivision that does not
include a numerical minimum threshold. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 66424 (West,
Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.).
79.
This point underlies Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent. He complains that if an
owner buys two contiguous lots from different sellers, and the state then prohibits all
development on one of the lots, treating the two lots as the relevant denominator means that
“the owner’s per se takings claim is gone, and he is left to roll the dice under the Penn
Central balancing framework.” Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1955 (2017) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting).
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2. Any Segment on Which an Independently Viable Use Was Previously Permitted
In his student note, Professor John Fee argued that a landowner should be
entitled to select as a denominator any segment of land that, prior to the challenged
regulation, had a viable economic use independent of any surrounding land
segments.80 Fee argued that there was no single correct denominator, but that the
landowner would have to select a denominator broad enough that the landowner
could show that the selected land had an independently viable economic use;81 as a
result, the landowner could not select a small denominator to challenge setback
restrictions or other prohibitions on development of relatively small areas.82
The independent-viable-use approach to the denominator problem is
entirely consistent with the Lucas effort to prevent bypass of the condemnation
process. If a government entity seeks to preclude all development on a segment of
land on which development previously would have been permitted, the
government’s action looks functionally equivalent to condemning the segment for
public use. Moreover, permitting the landowner to define the denominator in this
way ensures that owners of large tracts are not disadvantaged simply because they
own multiple segments, each of which had an independently viable use before the
regulation.83
On the other hand, the independently viable-use denominator is a
problematic basis for evaluating whether a large developer’s justified expectations
have been frustrated. Suppose, for example, a developer sought to take advantage
of a statute or ordinance that authorized the developer to cluster residential
development on a portion of a tract but required that the developer leave the
remainder of the tract as open space.84 Development of the open space would have
been permitted until the developer built the cluster subdivision. Would the
developer then be able to define segments of the open space as the denominator for
a potential takings claim? Even though the regulation would leave the developer
with a reasonable return on the development as a whole—perhaps a larger return
80.
John E. Fee, Comment, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Taking
Claims, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1535, 1537 (1994). For application of the independent viable-use
test as a factor in denominator analysis, see City of Coeur d’Alene v. Simpson, 136 P.3d 310,
323 (Idaho 2006). Steven Eagle has proposed a similar test, focusing on what property
constitutes a “commercial unit.” Eagle, supra note 69, at 942.
81.
Fee, supra note 80, at 1557.
82.
Id. at 1559.
83.
Critics of a denominator that focuses on the quantity of land owned have
expressed concern about disadvantaging landowners of large parcels. In Professor Fee’s
view:
Unless some reason exists why the Takings Clause should be concerned
with deterring citizens from owning too much property at once, the
quantity of property an owner holds should have nothing to do with
whether a regulation of one part of an owner’s property is a taking of
that part.
Fee, supra note 80, at 1557.
84.
See, e.g., N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-738 (McKinney 2017) (authorizing cluster
developments). See generally STERK ET AL., supra note 36.
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than if the developer had built a conventional subdivision85—the developer might
have a plausible claim that it was not receiving a reasonable return on the open
space.86
3. Land Treated by the Owner as a Distinct Economic Unit
In a number of cases, the Federal Circuit has concluded that when a
landowner owns a large tract of land but treats some subset of that land as a
distinct economic unit, the subset, and not the large tract, should serve as the
denominator for a takings claim. Lost Tree Village Corp. v. United States87 is
illustrative. In that case, the developer, who over a five-year period purchased
nearly all of a 2,750-acre tract of land on the Florida Coast, challenged the denial
of a wetlands permit on a 4.99-acre parcel within the tract. Although the developer
had already developed about 1,300 acres of the tract by the mid-1990s, the
developer had ignored the 4.99-acre parcel until 2002, years after most
knowledgeable people considered the development complete.88 When the Army
Corps of Engineers denied a fill permit for the parcel (1.41 acres of which
consisted of submerged lands), the developer brought a takings challenge. The
Federal Circuit held that the 4.99-acre parcel, not the development as a whole,
constituted the relevant denominator because the developer had not treated the
4.99-acre parcel as part of the same economic unit as other land it had developed.89
The distinct economic-unit standard does not require the developer to
prove that the segment at issue had an independently viable use, but does
apparently require the developer to show that it had treated the parcel separate and
apart from neighboring land.90 Like the independent-viable-use standard, the
distinct-economic-unit standard identifies cases in which regulation appears to be a
substitute for condemnation and provides large landowners with the same
protection as small ones. Hence, the test comports with the reasons that underlie
the Court’s opinion in Lucas. But, like the independent-viable-use standard, the
distinct-economic-use standard holds out hope for compensation even when a

85.
Development of the cluster subdivision might reduce the costs of roads and
utilities. See STERK ET AL., supra note 36, at 111.
86.
If the developer elected the cluster subdivision rather than a conventional
subdivision, one might argue that the developer had received a return in the form of
approval of the cluster subdivision. But if the municipality indicated that it would not
approve a traditional subdivision or would do so only on onerous terms, the developer’s
claim, however weak as a matter of fairness, would become more plausible if the court were
required to treat all or part of the open space as a denominator.
87.
707 F.3d 1286 (Fed Cir. 2013).
88.
Id. at 1290.
89.
Id. at 1293.
90.
For instance, the court in Lost Tree Village cited, with apparent approval,
Forest Props., Inc. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999), in which the Federal
Circuit held that the relevant denominator included all 62 acres owned by a single
landowner, even though the landowner had acquired the property from two separate prior
owners, because the developer treated the two tracts as a single economic unit. Id. at 1365–
66.
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landowner has realized a reasonable return on investment.91 In that sense, the
independent-viable-use standard is inconsistent with the Penn Central premise that
the Takings Clause is designed primarily to protect justified expectations.
4. Summary
Penn Central and Lucas reflect fundamentally different concerns about
land-use regulation. Penn Central rests on the premise that regulation is an
appropriate tool for achieving public objectives, subject to review to protect the
justified expectations of landowners.92 Lucas, by contrast, evinces concern about
government use of regulation as a wealth-transfer device.93
The denominator a court uses in evaluating takings claims is likely to
reflect the concern the court deems paramount. Although ideology undoubtedly
plays a role in that inquiry, other factors are also at play. Consider, for instance,
two variations on the Lost Tree Village case.
First, assume a developer owns 2,750 acres assembled from a variety of
sellers. The relevant local government entity authorizes extensive development but
requires 100 acres of open space along the waterfront to provide water access to
residents of the new development. In that instance, the regulation might appear to
be primarily designed to make the development more attractive as a whole and
might increase value to prospective purchasers. A court would be unlikely both to
allow the developer to reap the increased prices from purchasers and to compel the
local government to pay the developer for the 100 acres that increased the value of
the remaining land. Treating the entire 2,750 acres as the denominator ensures the
developer a reasonable return.
Second, assume the same local government has approved the same
development in six separate stages, never voicing any concern about open space or
water access. When the developer applies to complete the final stage—
development of 100 acres of waterfront—the local government objects and
requires that the 100 acres be maintained as open space. Although the developer
may have already received a reasonable return on the developer’s initial
investment, the same prohibition on development of the final 100 acres now looks
more like a wealth transfer from the developer to the neighboring landowners.94 As
91.
In Lost Tree Village itself, after the Federal Circuit determined the
denominator, the Court of Federal Claims concluded that the regulation constituted a taking.
Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 219, 233 (2014). The Federal Circuit
affirmed. Lost Tree Village Corp. v. United States, 787 F.3d 1111, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
92.
In Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), the
Court started by listing the many kinds of regulation that promote public health, safety, and
welfare, id. at 124–127, and then turned to “the severity of the impact of the law on
appellants’ parcel.” Id. at 136.
93.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992)
(“[R]egulations that leave the owner of land without economically or beneficial options for
its use . . . carry with them a heightened risk that private property is being pressed into some
form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm.”).
94.
Many regulations have the effect, and even the objective, of transferring
wealth from one class of persons to another. In this respect, they resemble taxes. See
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a result, Lucas concerns might predominate and the court might treat only the 100
acres as the denominator.95
C. The Murr Dissent and the Role of State Law
Against this tension about the premises that lie behind the takings
doctrine and the resulting confusion about the appropriate denominator, the Court
granted certiorari in the Murr case. As already noted, the facts of the case made the
Murrs’ takings claim implausible on any theory.96 Thus, it is not surprising that the
dispute between the majority and the dissenters was rooted in disagreement about
theory, not about ultimate the result. Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts conceded that
the majority’s “bottom-line conclusion does not trouble me.”97 Among the areas of
theory that provoked the sharpest disagreement is the role of state law in
determining the appropriate takings denominator. For the Chief Justice, state law
was dispositive;98 for the majority, it was a factor to be weighed among others in
the denominator inquiry.99
Except as constrained by the Constitution or federal statutes, American
property law is state law.100 The Court’s takings cases have consistently
recognized that the Takings Clause operates not by specifying the content of
property law but by protecting owners against precipitous changes in state property
law.101 The distinct-investment-backed expectations that played a central role in
the Penn Central opinion could only have been formulated against a background
of state law. The Lucas opinion recognized that if background state law gave a
generally Penalver, supra note 72, at 2185−87. The Court, and particularly Justice Kennedy,
has expressed concern about government measures that transfer property from one private
party to another, even in cases where the government action is accompanied by
compensation. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 487 (2005) (noting that a
one-to-one transfer of property “would certainly raise a suspicion that a private purpose was
afoot”); see also id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“A court applying rational-basis
review under the Public Use Clause should strike down a taking that, by a clear showing, is
intended to favor a particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public
benefits.”).
95.
On the other hand, as Danaya Wright has argued, a court might conclude that
the developer’s own development actions in the earlier stages created a greater need for
restrictions on the last 100 acres. Danaya C. Wright, A New Time for Denominators:
Toward a Dynamic Theory of Property in the Regulatory Takings Relevant Parcel Analysis,
34 ENVTL. L. 175, 212–13 (2004).
96.
See supra Section I.B.2.
97.
Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1950 (2017) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
98.
Id.
99.
Id. at 1945.
100.
See Bd. of Regents State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (“Property
interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law.”); see also Melvyn Durchslag, Forgotten Federalism: The Takings
Clause and Local Land Use Decisions, 59 MD L. REV. 464, 494 (2000) (“Property . . . owes
both its existence and its contours to positive law, local positive law.”).
101.
See generally Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory
Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 206, 210–11 (2004).
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landowner no right to develop, even a regulation completely prohibiting
development would not constitute a taking of property.102 The premises behind
these decisions and others are clear: states define property rights; the Takings
Clause protects against abrupt changes in those rights.
What implications does this framework have for the denominator
problem? For Chief Justice Roberts, the answer was self-evident: the denominator
should be resolved by reference to state law. In fact, however, the issue is more
complicated.
As Professor Tom Merrill has established, defining property for takings
purposes involves an amalgam of federal and state law.103 Although state law
defines the content of property rights, states are not free to define rights as
property and, therefore, to confer constitutional protection on those rights. Which
state-created rights fall within the category of property protected by the Takings
Clause is a matter for federal determination.104 For instance, if Nevada were to
confer on its citizens broad rights to engage in gambling or prostitution, Nevada’s
efforts to classify those rights as property rights would not make them property for
purposes of the Takings Clause. The Supreme Court might determine that those
rights constituted property rights, but the classification issue would be a matter of
federal constitutional law, not Nevada state law.
Within the category of constitutionally protected property rights, states
may differ significantly in what rights they protect and how much protection they
provide.105 The U.S. Constitution does not mandate that states recognize any
particular property rights. States might even differ in how extensively they protect
the right to exclude; in some states, for instance, the public trust doctrine permits
broad public rights to use waterfront land, while in other states, waterfront owners
have a broader right to exclude members of the public.106 The focus of the Takings
Clause is on limiting change in property rights.107 How much change the Takings
Clause authorizes is an issue of federal constitutional law, not state law.
Much as defining property for takings purposes involves an amalgam of
state and federal law, determining the takings denominator combines elements of
state and federal law. State law plays an obvious role. If state law has never
recognized a particular property right, that right cannot constitute part of the

102.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028–30 (1992).
103.
See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional
Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885 (2000).
104.
Id. at 952. In Merrill’s words, courts “seek to discover from the
Constitution’s traditions general criteria that serve to differentiate property rights from other
types of interests.” Id. Then, “state law is consulted not to discover the definition of
property; it is reviewed to determine if interests have been created that correspond to the
federal criteria for the identification of constitutional property.” Id.
105.
Sterk, supra note 101, at 223.
106.
Id.
107.
Id. at 224.
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takings denominator.108 To the extent that Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion
suggests that the denominator should reflect factors not derived from state-law
rights, Chief Justice Roberts’s criticism of the majority opinion is on the mark.
By the same token, however, which state-law rights should constitute the
denominator is an issue of federal law. The need for a denominator was not
preordained. For instance, the Supreme Court could have determined that only
permanent, physical occupations constitute takings.109 Had the Court taken that
path, denominators would have been irrelevant.110 But because the Court
concluded both in Penn Central and in Lucas that the Takings Clause protects
against some forms of economic loss, the Court had to develop a baseline against
which to measure the loss. Because the denominator’s significance is purely a
construct of federal constitutional law, it makes little sense to choose a
denominator independent of the federal constitutional purposes the denominator
serves.111
The parcel-as-a-whole formulation the Court has embraced is itself a
choice dictated by federal constitutional concerns, not by state law. For instance,
New York law permitted Penn Central to sell the right to develop above Grand
Central Terminal and UGP Properties bought that right.112 The Court could have
concluded that since those development rights were property rights under state law
and the city’s landmarks ordinance interfered with those rights, the development
rights constituted the denominator for takings purposes. In rejecting that
denominator, the Court invoked concern about conceptual severance—a concern
relevant to federal constitutional law, but not New York property law.
Because the phrase parcel as a whole is imbued with federal
constitutional significance, it would be peculiar to leave states free to influence the
constitutional denominator by broadening or narrowing what constitutes a parcel
as a whole. Chief Justice Roberts anticipated this potential problem and argued
108.
Cf. id. at 222 (noting that if state law did not create property, subsequent
state action cannot take that property).
109.
In Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 322 (2002), Justice Stevens distinguished between jurisprudence involving
physical takings which he concluded was “as old as the Republic” and regulatory takings
jurisprudence, which “is of more recent vintage.”
110.
See Justin R. Pidot, Eroding the Parcel, 39 VT. L. REV. 647, 656–57 (2015)
(noting that denominator is irrelevant to permanent, physical occupation claims under
Loretto).
111.
Cf. Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and Speech: The Legacy of
PruneYard v. Robins, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 25 (1997) (“When the Fifth Amendment states
that private property cannot be taken for public use without just compensation, one can
hardly suppose that a state is able to deflect the power of this constitutional command by
defining property in ways that exclude some of its essential attributes.”); see also Frank
Michelman, The Common Law Baseline and Restitution for the Lost Commons: A Reply to
Professor Epstein, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 57–58 (1997).
112.
See generally Sara C. Bronin, Solar Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1236
(2009) (noting that common law has long recognized airspace as property distinct from
ground or mineral estates).
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that what constitutes the “parcel as a whole” should not entail a “takings-specific
definition,” but should instead be determined using “ordinary principles of
Wisconsin property law.”113
The inquiry into ordinary principles of state property law is not as
straightforward as the Chief Justice would have it. Chief Justice Roberts plucked a
definition from a single Wisconsin statute dealing with how a developer must
describe lots when the developer seeks subdivision approval from a municipal
body. That statute provides that when a subdivision plat has been recorded, “the
lots in that plat shall be described by the name of the plat and the lot and block in
the plat for all purposes, including those of assessment, taxation, devise, descent
and conveyance . . . .”114 But other Wisconsin statutes provide a variety of
mechanisms for describing parcels. For instance, the Wisconsin tax statute makes
it explicit that an assessment is valid if contiguous lots are assessed and valued
together as one parcel.115 Moreover, Wisconsin law provides for division of
ownership into parcels that are not always strictly horizontal. For instance,
Wisconsin’s condominium statute authorizes condominium units, which “may
include two or more noncontiguous areas,”116 and provides that “[a] unit, together
with its undivided interest in the common elements, for all purposes constitutes
real property.”117 It is not at all clear how a court would decide which of these
provisions constitute “ordinary principles of Wisconsin property law” without
considering the purpose of the inquiry: finding the denominator that best serves
federal constitutional law objectives.
Of course, treating a parcel with a separate block and lot number as the
takings denominator would be consistent with a takings jurisprudence concerned
primarily with constraining condemnation bypass, but that consistency has little to
do with principles of Wisconsin property law.
D. The Majority Opinion: Rejection of State Law?
In contrast with the Chief Justice, the Court’s majority appears to inject
factors independent of state law into the denominator inquiry. If that appearance
were accurate, the Court’s approach would be inconsistent with the foundation of
the Takings Clause, which, as the Chief Justice noted in his dissent, “protects

113.
Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1956 (2017) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
114.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 236.28 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Act 36).
115.
See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 70.28 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Act 135)
(providing that “no assessment of real property which has been or shall be made shall be
held invalid or irregular for the reason that several lots, tracts, or parcels of land have been
assessed and valued together as one parcel and not separately, where the same are
contiguous and owned by the same person at the time of such assessment.”); see also WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 706.02(1)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Act 135) (providing that
conveyances need identify the land, but not necessarily by lot and block). For a case
sustaining a transfer made without reference to lot and block, see, e.g., Zapuchlak v. Hucal,
262 N.W.2d 514, 520 (Wis. 1978).
116.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 703.02(15) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Act 135).
117.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 703.04 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Act 135).
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private property rights as state law creates and defines them.”118 A more charitable
reading of Justice Kennedy’s opinion, however, reveals that the factors the
majority cites are all rooted in state law; the Court’s primary objection is to the
notion that any single state law should be treated as a dispositive exposition of
state property law.
At points in the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy questions the
centrality of state law in the takings inquiry.119 But his rejection of state law as the
focus for the denominator inquiry rests on the fear that states might define property
interests in a way that eviscerates the Takings Clause. In particular, the majority
expresses concern that “defining the parcel by reference to state law could defeat a
challenge even to a state enactment that alters permitted uses of property in ways
inconsistent with reasonable investment-backed expectations.”120 That is, Justice
Kennedy expressed concern about a state law that would significantly alter or
change an owner’s preexisting property rights. That concern is the primary focus
of the Takings Clause, which is not to dictate the way in which states shape and
define property rights but is instead designed to limit the way that states may
reshape or redefine property rights. Thus, in Palazzolo, the case on whose dictum
Justice Kennedy relies, the Court’s concern was whether “by prospective
legislation the State can shape and define property rights and reasonable
investment-backed expectations.”121 The Court’s answer was that if a state’s
enactment otherwise constituted a taking, the passage of title to a subsequent
owner would not insulate the state from liability for the taking.122 But the Court
had occasion to consider the issue only because the state had changed the
development rights associated with the property. Nothing in Palazzolo suggests
that federal law, or any other body of law, displaced state law as the source of
property rights in land.
Ultimately, however, the factors the majority identifies as relevant to the
denominator all have a state-law foundation. The majority starts with treatment of
the land under state law as its first factor.123 The Court’s second factor—physical
characteristics of the land—focuses on whether the landowner should have
understood that its land was subject to regulatory risk.124 But that regulatory risk is
itself a byproduct of state law, which creates the mechanisms and political

118.
Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
119.
The court expresses caution about “the view that property rights under the
Takings Clause should be coextensive with state law.” Id. at 1944. The Court also indicates
that its test “weighs whether the state enactments at issue accord with other indicia of
reasonable expectations about property.” Id. at 1947.
120.
Id. at 1945.
121.
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626 (2001) (emphasis added).
122.
Id. at 627–30.
123.
Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945.
124.
In identifying physical characteristics as a factor in determining the
denominator, the Court emphasized that “[i]n particular, it may be relevant that the property
is located in an area that is subject to, or likely to become subject to, environmental or other
regulation.” Id. at 1945−46.
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environment for regulation.125 The final factor—the value of the land under the
challenged regulation126—reflects landowners’ options under the state’s regulatory
environment.
The Court could, of course, have endorsed other formulations of the
denominator that would have been consistent with state law. For instance, if the
Court’s primary concern had been avoiding condemnation bypass, the Court might
have endorsed a formulation that focused on whether a parcel had an independent
use under preexisting state law.127 The Court’s formulation privileged a view of the
Takings Clause that protects expectations rather than one that avoids
condemnation bypass. That choice is one that reflects the majority’s federal
constitutional values. But in making that choice, the Court incorporated factors
into its denominator formulation that are all closely tied to existing state law.
Despite its cautions about state law, the Court has not removed the state-law
anchor from the denominator determination.

III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF MURR: THE DEATH OF LUCAS?
Over the course of the last 25 years, the Court has compartmentalized
implicit takings claims into two categories: Penn Central claims and Lucas claims.
Murr’s treatment of the denominator problem signals no significant change for
Penn Central claims but, taken in conjunction with Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent,
should make it exceedingly difficult for landowners to seek or obtain
compensation on a Lucas claim.
A. Penn Central Claims
Most Penn Central claims were doomed long before Murr. The Court has
never found any state or local land-use regulation to constitute a Penn Central
taking. Moreover, fewer than 10% of regulatory takings claims succeed in the
lower courts when the landowner cannot allege a Lucas type wipeout.128 The
landowner’s odds are even longer when the landowner’s primary complaint is that
the regulation involved a diminution of value.129
Considering these low success rates, Murr’s multi-factor balancing test is
unlikely to have a major impact. In the few Penn Central-type cases that have
involved a dispute over the relevant denominator, landowner success rates are
already small—lower than 10%.130 Moreover, most of the cases in which the
denominator is at issue are likely to be cases in which a developer (rather than a
homeowner, commercial owner, or landlord) challenges the regulation. On

125.
Indeed, Justice Kennedy himself has recognized that the expectations of
landowners are shaped in considerable measure by existing law. See Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment).
126.
137 S. Ct. at 1946.
127.
See Fee, supra note 80, at 1537.
128.
See Krier & Sterk, supra note 10, at 58 tbl.2.
129.
Id. at 66 tbl.4 (success rate of 5%).
130.
Id.
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average, developers who bring takings claims are even less successful than other
categories of landowners.131
When a court is unsympathetic to a landowner’s takings claim, Penn
Central already provides the court with the tools it needs to reject the claim. Penn
Central does not mandate that a regulation preserve a landowner’s investmentbacked expectations; instead, a court is directed to balance economic factors,
pursuant to no set formula against other factors including the regulation’s
purpose.132 If a court finds the purpose sufficiently important, the regulation may
stand despite significant losses to the landowner, regardless of the denominator the
court uses in evaluating the regulation’s interference with the landowner’s return.
As the Chief Justice points out, the result of Murr’s resolution of the
denominator issue “is that the government’s regulatory interests will come into
play not once, but twice”: first in identifying the denominator and second in
determining whether the regulation has placed too great a burden on the
property.133 The structure the Court lays out may alter the structure of briefs filed
on behalf of landowners and government regulators, but it is unlikely to make
much difference in the result because counting the government’s regulatory
interests even once is more than sufficient to overcome almost all Penn Central
claims.
B. Lucas Claims
Landowners who claim that regulation has eliminated all economic use of
their land—the hallmark of a Lucas claim—have enjoyed considerably more
litigation success than landowners who can only advance Penn Central claims.134
These “wipeout” claims are far less frequent because relatively few landowners
can plausibly claim that government regulations have left them with no economic
use for their land.
The flexible denominator developed in Murr may well be the death knell
for many of these wipeout claims. Suppose a developer acquires multiple parcels
of land, on each of which development would have been permissible. The
developer, however, assembled the parcels to complete a larger project. Suppose
the municipality then acts to prohibit the development of some of the parcels (for
instance, those nearest a sea coast) or changes permissible zoning density in a way
that makes one or more of the parcels too small to permit development. In that
case, the approach outlined in the Murr opinion would authorize a court to use the
combined parcels as a denominator (which would defeat any Lucas claim) if the
assembly were reasonably foreseeable or if the restriction might increase the value
of the remaining property (perhaps by ensuring that there will be no development
between the remaining property and the sea coast).
131.
Id. at 76 tbl.7.
132.
See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124–28
(1978).
133.
Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1955 (2017).
134.
See Krier & Sterk, supra note 10, at 59 tbl.2 (the success rate for wipeout
claims is 44.1% compared with the 9.9% success rate for challenges to other regulations).
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One might argue that combining parcels in this way would constitute an
improper balancing of the factors articulated in Murr. But the Supreme Court has
neither the resources nor the inclination to review many takings cases.135
Moreover, the Court has limited expertise on issues of state property law.136 As a
result, the Court’s discussion of flexibility is, in effect, a delegation of authority to
state courts.137 The likely result, then, is that state courts can use Murr’s multifactor test to broaden the scope of property included in the denominator, and
consequently, reject many Lucas claims.
There will remain, of course, some cases in which regulation precludes all
use of landowners’ property no matter how broadly the denominator is defined.
Murr’s expansion of the denominator will have no impact on those cases.
Paradoxically, however, it is Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent that may signal the
death of those claims. The Chief Justice conceded that the potential use of the
Murrs’ vacant lot as recreational space, or as a valuable addition to a neighboring
lot, “could be relevant” to whether the regulation denied the landowner all
economically beneficial or productive use under Lucas.138 By concluding that
those factors might be relevant in evaluating a Lucas claim, the Chief Justice is
effectively deciding some of the issues that have divided lower courts.139 Virtually
every parcel of land large enough to develop would have some market value to an
abutting neighbor or some value for potential recreational use. If, as the Chief
Justice suggests, those values count in evaluating whether a regulation has
eliminated all economically beneficial use, a landowner would find it virtually
impossible to succeed on a Lucas claim. Of course, the Chief Justice was writing
in dissent, but if the dissenters are willing to read Lucas so narrowly, the Justices
in the majority are even more likely to do so. Perhaps more importantly, the Chief
Justice’s dissent provides ammunition for state courts otherwise inclined to read
Lucas narrowly.
Taken together, the majority’s treatment of the denominator issue and the
dissent’s concessions about what constitutes economically beneficial or productive
use will make it very difficult for any owner to prevail on a Lucas claim.

CONCLUSION
When landowners level a takings challenge against state or local
regulation, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has been marked by opinions
extolling the importance of property rights while upholding state and local

135.
See Sterk, supra note 101, at 237.
136.
Id. at 226–28.
137.
Id. at 271.
138.
Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1957.
139.
Compare, e.g., Wyer v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 747 A.2d 192, 193 (Me. 2000)
(holding that denial of a variance was not a taking when the landowner could use land for
recreational use, and emphasizing “the value of the property to abutters as an additional
factor in determining the value of the property”), with Moroney v. Mayor & Council of Old
Tappan, 633 A.2d 1045, 1048–49 (N.J. App. 1993) (rejecting the argument that
combination with a neighboring parcel could make land economically productive).
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regulation of those rights.140 That jurisprudence reflects the Court’s institutional
competence, particularly its inability to supervise the land-use regulatory process
considering the disparate property law rules that prevail in different states.
Murr is consistent with the Court’s prevailing pattern. Specifically,
Murr’s treatment of the denominator problem delegates to state courts the
authority to balance a variety of factors as they see fit. For the vast bulk of takings
claims—those governed by the Penn Central framework¾Murr will make very
little difference. But for that small group of landowners who claim that regulation
has denied them all economically productive use of their land, Murr makes their
already steep uphill climb even steeper.

140.

Krier & Sterk, supra note 10, at 83−84.

